University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 3

Article 6

5-2017

Comment: Solving the Depraved Heart Murder
Problem in Maryland: A Suggestion for Successful
Prosecution of Police Officers
Rachele Norfolk

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Norfolk, Rachele (2017) "Comment: Solving the Depraved Heart Murder Problem in Maryland: A Suggestion for Successful
Prosecution of Police Officers," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 46 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol46/iss3/6

This Peer Reviewed Articles is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

SOLVING THE DEPRAVED HEART MURDER PROBLEM IN
MARYLAND: A SUGGESTION FOR SUCCESSFUL
PROSECUTION OF POLICE OFFICERS
Rachele Norfolk*
I.

INTRODUCTION
It is true that we have grown adroit at feigning astonishment
at the episodic convulsions of violence in American cities,
but that doesn’t make them any less predictable or their
roots any less apparent. With the exception of the riots that
followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., every
major riot by the black community of an American city
since the Second World War has been ignited by a single
issue: police tactics.1

After police officers arrested Freddie Gray and he died in their
custody, riots erupted in Baltimore City, as people from across the
world watched through their television screens.2
Rioters
outnumbered police officers as clashes between the two occurred;
meanwhile, stores were being looted and buildings were either
vandalized or burned to the ground.3 Hundreds of people were
involved in the riots; schools shut down, streets closed, and
businesses sent workers home.4 The city and the nation “unleashed a
maelstrom of unrest” out of outrage and want for answers after

*
1.

2.

3.
4.

J.D. Candidate, May 2017, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S., Paralegal
Studies, 2014, Stevenson University. Special thanks to my parents for always
encouraging me to follow my dreams, and to Chris, for his endless love and support.
Jelani Cobb, City Life, NEW YORKER (May 11, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/city-life-what-racism-has-done-tobaltimore. Police argue that their aggressive tactics are to reduce high rates of crime
and violence and are “a hallmark of civic concern,” rather than a sign of callous
disregard. Id.
Kevin Rector, Scott Dance & Luke Broadwater, Riots Erupt: Baltimore Descends
into Chaos, Violence, Looting, BALT. SUN (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:01 AM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-police-studentviolence-20150427-story.html#page=1.
Id.
Id.
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Freddie Gray’s death, leaving police officials to explain what
happened, or failed to happen, in this case.5
As lawyer and protest planner Malik Shabazz indicated, there was a
“burn behind the burn” in Baltimore due to ongoing police brutality
nationally.6 Two months prior to the Freddie Gray incident, FBI
Director James Comey indicated in an address to students at
Georgetown University that Americans had to face some “hard
truths” about the killings of black men by police officers.7 Director
Comey explained that police officers of any race exhibit “‘mental
shortcuts’ that become ‘almost irresistible’ when most of the suspects
they arrest are black males.”8 This can lead to the assumption that
any black man is a potential criminal, and social science research
indicates that even black officers are susceptible to reacting in such a
manner.9
Former President Barack Obama, speaking at a press conference
after the death of Freddie Gray, stated that there have been too many
instances where officers’ interactions with individuals have raised
some troubling questions.10 He continued saying, “[I]t comes up . . .
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

Justin Fenton, Gray Suffered Head Injury in Prisoner Van, Sources Familiar with
Investigation Say, BALT. SUN (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:01 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-grayinvestigation-completed-20150430-story.html.
Jonathan Pitts, Shabazz Plans Rally for Thousands Saturday, BALT. SUN (Apr. 28,
2015, 8:37 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/breaking/bs-md-shabazzsaturday-20150428-story.html.
Editorial, ‘Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist,’ BALT. SUN (Feb. 17, 2015, 12:30 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-comey-race-20150217story.html. While the focus of this Comment will not center on racial issues between
arrestees and police officers, it is important to note the conscious or unconscious
racial biases that exist and influence conduct toward African American men in
arrestee situations.
Id.
Id. One journalist describes the criticism as not of the police per se, “but as a symbol
of an entire web of failed social policies, on education, employment, health and
housing.” Cobb, supra note 1. In 2014, there were 211 murders in Baltimore, and
189 of the victims were black males. Id. Cobb exclaims that “Baltimore doesn’t
have a homicide problem; it has a black-male-death problem.” Id.
Cobb, supra note 1; see also Olevia Boykin et al., A Better Standard for the Use of
Deadly Force, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opini
on/a-better-standard-for-the-use-of-deadly-force.html?_r=1.
American police officers killed 74 unarmed black people in
2015. From January through July, according to The Washington
Post, unarmed black men were seven times more likely than
unarmed white men to die by police gunfire. An analysis of F.B.I.
data from 2010 to 2012 concluded that the police killed black men
ages 15 to 19 at a rate 21 times greater than the statistic for white
men the same age. Department of Justice numbers indicate that a
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once a week now, or once every couple of weeks. . . . [T]his has been
a slow-rolling crisis. This has been going on for a long time. This is
not new, and we shouldn’t pretend that it’s new.”11
Perhaps some justice for this not-so-new phenomenon may come in
the form of charging police officers for misconduct, as was done in
the Freddie Gray case.12 However, this is only half of the battle. The
other half comes from a successful prosecution.13 One of the six
officers charged in the death of Freddie Gray, Caesar Goodson, was
charged with second-degree depraved heart murder,14 but he was
ultimately not convicted.15
Currently, there is no statutory framework for depraved heart
murder in Maryland.16 Additionally, there is a problem with
prosecuting this specific kind of murder because Maryland’s common
law provides very vague and somewhat flimsy guidance.17 While
prosecuting police officers may prove to be a challenging feat itself,
it may be even harder when an officer fails to follow certain
procedures or act in certain ways through “acts of omission.”18
This Comment will proceed in four parts following this
introduction. Part II will provide background information on the
Freddie Gray case19 and the common law in Maryland on depraved

11.
12.

13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

black person is about four times as likely to die in custody or
while being arrested than a white person is.
Boykin et al., supra note 10.
Cobb, supra note 1.
Jean Marbella, Six Baltimore Police Officers Charged in Freddie Gray’s Death,
BALT. SUN (May 2, 2015, 12:16 AM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-freddie-graymainbar-20150501-story.html.
See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH.
POST (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/t
housands-dead-few-prosecuted/.
Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Officer Caesar Goodson, Facing the Most Serious
Charges in Death of Freddie Gray, Heads to Trial, BALT. SUN (June 5, 2016, 6:13
PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-caesargoodson-freddie-gray-trial-preview-20160605-story.html; see also Marbella, supra
note 12.
See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
Robinson v. State, 517 A.2d 94, 100 (Md. 1986).
See infra Section II.B.1.
Omission is defined as “[a] failure to do something: esp., a neglect of duty.”
Omission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
For purposes of this Comment, the facts used when discussing the Freddie Gray case
come from information provided by the Baltimore Police Department, statements
made by Baltimore City State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby, and in court testimony as
chronicled in numerous newspaper articles and other sources. See, e.g., Brandon
Longo, Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest to His Final Spinal Cord Injury, CBS BALT.
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heart murder and the lesser-included offense of involuntary
manslaughter.20 The problematic ambiguities in the current law will
be explored when applying the common law to the prosecution of
Officer Caesar Goodson.21 Part III will explore statutes that prove
helpful and provide guidance for a possible statutory framework.22
Part IV explores various tort concepts, such as common carrier
liability and professionals’ higher duty of care in certain
circumstances, with the intention to borrow from these concepts for a
successful prosecution of a police officer charged with depraved
heart murder.23
Part V proposes a statute for depraved heart murder, using existing
criminal statutory schemes as a guide.24 The proposed statute uses a
totality of the circumstances approach, combining the current
common law on depraved heart murder with tort theories.25
Essentially, this recommended framework will proffer that when an
officer takes someone into care who can no longer take care of
himself, the officer owes a higher duty.26 More specifically, the
standards and training to which police officers must adhere, the
restraint on freedom of movement in police custody providing for a
vulnerable victim, and evidence that one is suffering from a medical
emergency and the failure to respond can be examined in this totality
approach.27 This Comment will analyze the Freddie Gray facts to
demonstrate how the statute would operate in depraved heart murder
prosecutions.28
II. THE FREDDIE GRAY CASE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF A
SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION UNDER THE THEORY OF
DEPRAVED HEART MURDER
Malice in the context of “depraved heart” murder is not entirely
clear.29 While the common law attempts to shed light on what

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

(June 23, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/23/timelinefreddie-grays-arrest-to-his-fatal-spinal-cord-injury/. This Comment uses these facts
to demonstrate how to apply the proposed theory of prosecution in a hypothetical
situation.
See infra Sections II.A–B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section V.A.
See infra Sections V.A–B.
See infra Section V.B.
See infra Section V.B.
See infra notes 75–80, 88–92 and accompanying text.
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circumstances elevate this type of unintentional murder to stand on
parallel footing with an intentional killing, the use of vague terms and
the interchanging of those terms to define the lessor-included offense
of involuntary manslaughter add to the uncertainty.30 The facts
surrounding the death of Freddie Gray illustrate the problems with
the existing law on depraved heart murder, specifically problems
concerning the failures to act and what level of culpability should be
attached to each of those omissions.31
A. Facts of the Freddie Gray Case
Freddie Gray was a 25-year-old African American who was
apprehended and arrested after fleeing when encountering police
officers.32 According to Baltimore City State’s Attorney Marilyn
Mosby, “Mr. Gray suffered a severe and critical neck injury as a
result of being handcuffed, shackled by his feet, and unrestrained
inside [a Baltimore City Police Department] wagon,” dying a week
later.33 The driver of the police van, Officer Caesar Goodson Jr., was
charged with second-degree depraved heart murder, while the other
officers were charged with lessor offenses.34
When Gray was arrested, he was handcuffed behind his back.35 He
indicated that he could not breathe and requested an inhaler but was
denied medical care, placed into the van, and never secured by a seat
belt.36 While en route to central booking, the van stopped four
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

36.

See infra notes 75–77, 95 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Sections II.A–B, Part V.
David A. Graham, The ‘Depraved-Heart Murder’ of Freddie Gray, ATLANTIC (May
1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/05/the-depraved-heartmurder-of-freddie-gray/392132/.
Id.
Id.
Officer Caesar R. Goodson Jr., the driver of the van, was
charged with second-degree murder, three counts of manslaughter
and assault. Lt. Brian W. Rice was charged with manslaughter,
assault and false imprisonment. Sgt. Alicia D. White and Officer
William G. Porter were charged with manslaughter and assault.
Officers Garrett E. Miller and Edward M. Nero were charged with
assault and false imprisonment.
All were charged with
misconduct in office.
Marbella, supra note 12.
Justin Fenton, Six Baltimore Police Officers Indicted in Death of Freddie Gray,
BALT. SUN (May 21, 2015, 9:29 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-freddie-grayofficer-indictments-20150521-story.html.
See id.
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times.37 During the first stop, Gray was removed from the van and
flex cuffs were placed on his wrists and leg shackles on his ankles,
after which he was placed into the van on the floor on his stomach.38
Officer Goodson stopped the van a second time to “check on Gray”;
he did not render medical assistance.39
The van stopped for a third time numerous blocks away so that
Goodson could check on Gray’s status.40 According to Marilyn
Mosby, “Mr. Gray at that time requested help and indicated that he
could not breathe.”41 Furthermore, “Officer Porter asked Mr. Gray if
he needed a medic, at which time Mr. Gray indicated at least twice
that he was in need of a medic.”42 Officer Porter had just arrived on
the scene, but neither he nor Officer Goodson rendered or requested
medical assistance.43 According to testimony, “Porter . . . told
Goodson that Central Booking wouldn’t accept Gray. . . . [and] that
he wasn’t sure if Gray was faking it to avoid going to jail.”44 Officer
Goodson then proceeded to make a fourth stop after there had been a
request “over departmental dispatch to pick up an additional
suspect”;45 he then picked up an arrestee from that location.46 At the
fourth stop, Officers White, Porter, and Goodson opened the doors of
the van and found Gray unresponsive,47 and still, no medical
assistance was rendered or summoned.48 Upon arrival at the police
station, and after the other prisoner was secured inside, Gray was

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.

See Graham, supra note 32. The stop at central booking was considered the fifth and
final stop. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Michael E. Ruane, Excerpts from Baltimore State’s Attorney Marilyn J. Mosby’s
Statement, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/excerpts-from-baltimore-states-attorneymarilyn-j-mosbys-statement/2015/05/01/5faf08fe-f027-11e4-8abcd6aa3bad79dd_story.html?utm_term=.39c107681807.
Id.; see also Application for Statement of Charges at 3, State v. Goodson, No.
6B02294452 (Md. Dist. Ct. Balt. City May 1, 2015).
Graham, supra note 32.
Longo, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. While the State claimed Gray was found unresponsive at this time, Officer Porter
denied it, but did admit that Gray indicated that “he still needed help at this stop.
Porter says [he] told Sgt. White that Gray needed medical help. No medic was
called.” Id.
Id.
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found not breathing.49 On April 19, 2015, Gray was pronounced
dead.50
Freddie Gray’s autopsy report surmised that Gray suffered from
neck and spinal injuries.51 During the stop to pick up the additional
prisoner,52 Gray was found “slumped over” and could only make
“minimal responses to direct questions.”53 The injury to his spinal
cord would have had “direct effects” on Gray’s ability to breathe.54
According to Dr. Morris Marc Soriano, Gray’s “‘brain would have
likely survived’ had he been given a breathing tube
sooner . . . . Instead, Gray suffered a ‘hunger for air’ as his condition
deteriorated . . . .”55
According to the autopsy, the police van’s sudden deceleration
most likely caused this “high-energy injury.”56 Gray’s death was
ruled a homicide because of the failure of the officers “to follow
safety procedures ‘through acts of omission.’”57 According to a
Baltimore Police Department policy directive, officers “shall ensure
the safety of a detainee when a person is taken into custody,
including obtaining medical treatment when necessary, at the nearest
emergency medical facility,” and “all passengers, regardless of age
and seat location, shall be restrained by seat belts or other authorized
restraining devices.”58
49.
50.
51.

52.

53.
54.
55.

56.
57.
58.

Application for Statement of Charges, supra note 42, at 5.
Id.
Justin Fenton, Autopsy of Freddie Gray Shows ‘High-Energy’ Impact, BALT. SUN
(June 24, 2015, 10:25 AM) [hereinafter Fenton I],
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-grayautopsy-20150623-story.html.
Id. This article considers the stop where Gray was placed in leg restraints as a
second stop, indicating that the first stop is when Gray was placed in the van
initially. However, this Comment and other sources do not consider the initial pick
up of Gray as a “stop.” See Graham, supra note 32.
Fenton I, supra note 51. But see Longo, supra note 19 (indicating that Gray’s exact
condition at this time was in dispute).
Fenton I, supra note 51.
Kevin Rector & Justin Fenton, Prior Back Injury Alleged as Officer’s Trial in
Freddie Gray Case Moves Forward, BALT. SUN (Dec. 7, 2015, 9:45 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-porter-trialmonday-20151207-story.html.
Fenton I, supra note 51.
Id. Allan, Assistant Medical Examiner, testified during Officer Porter’s trial that she
would not have ruled the death a homicide had medical care been sought for Mr.
Gray during the fourth stop of the van. Rector & Fenton, supra note 55.
Editorial, Baltimore Police, Seat Belts, & Freddie Gray, BALT. SUN (Oct. 19, 2015,
2:32 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-gray-van-seatbelt-20151019-story.html. The “policy [i.e., internal regulation] had only taken
effect nine days before Gray’s arrest and had been emailed to officers as part of a
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From the autopsy result, it appears as if there may have been abrupt
changes in the direction of the van.59 Because of the wrist and ankle
restraints, Gray was at risk for unsupported falls when the van would
accelerate or decelerate.60 According to the report, there were not
any previous injuries to Gray’s spine.61 A video of Gray’s arrest
shows that Gray was able to bear weight on his legs and speak while
police officers loaded him into the van, suggesting the arrest itself
was not the cause of the injuries sustained.62
Importantly, Assistant Medical Examiner Carol Allan noted that it
was “not an unforeseen event that a vulnerable individual was injured
during operation of the vehicle, and that without prompt medical
attention, the injury would prove fatal.”63 Following the Freddie
Gray incident, FOX31, a Denver television station, conducted an
investigation using a van and mimicking a sheriff’s department
vehicle.64 It used a certified crash test dummy and took a video.65
The video shows, at various speeds, that the dummy slid across the
bench seat and hit its skull, denting a steel barrier.66
Despite the charges the officers faced, none of them was convicted
of even a single crime.67 Judge Williams “questioned the legal
theories put forth by prosecutors.”68 While the defense offered
conflicting testimony by its own expert about the timeline of Gray’s
injuries, Judge Williams found there to be “equally plausible

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.
66.
67.

68.

package of directives six days after that.” Id. However, “cutting down on such
injuries through the use of seat belts has been a departmental priority since
2012 . . . . [T]he department stressed the need to seat belt detainees in
communications with commanders, conducted training on the issue and performed
spot checks for compliance.” Id.
Fenton I, supra note 51.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Mark Puente, ‘Rough Rides’ a Problem in Denver, Television Investigation Finds,
BALT. SUN (Nov. 14, 2015, 2:18 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-suninvestigates-denver-roughrides1115-20151113-story.html.
Id.
Id.
Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with Zero
Convictions Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016, 8:57 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrialmotions-20160727-story.html. After the acquittal of three of the officers, the
prosecutors dropped the cases against Officer Miller and Sgt. White. Id. The second
case against Porter was also dropped, after his first case ended with a hung jury. Id.
Id.
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scenarios” and determined that because the injuries were internal, it
would have been difficult to determine if Gray was in fact injured.69
B. Depraved Heart Murder Background
1. What is Depraved Heart Murder?
In Maryland, murder is a single crime that is divided into two
degrees by statute,70 of which second-degree murder has multiple
alternative mentes reae.71 According to Maryland case law, there are
four types of second-degree murder:
[F]irst, the killing of another person, other than by poison or
lying in wait, with the intent to kill but without the
deliberation and premeditation required for first-degree
murder; second, the killing of another person with the intent
to inflict such serious bodily harm that death would be the
likely result; third, “depraved heart murder,” . . . and fourth,
“murder committed in the perpetration of a felony other than
those enumerated in the first-degree murder statutes.”72
There is no depraved heart murder statute in Maryland.73 In fact,
1975 marked the first time that the Court of Appeals of Maryland
identified depraved heart murder by its name, with a fuller analysis
not developed until 1981.74
“[D]epraved heart murder is a category of homicide that has
consistently resisted descriptive definition, and the vague standards

69.

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Freddie Gray Case: Officer Caesar Goodson Jr. Not
Guilty on All Charges, BALT. SUN (June 23, 2016, 9:01 PM) [hereinafter Fenton &
Rector I], http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-cigoodson-verdict-20160623-story.html.
Owens v. State, 906 A.2d 989, 1027 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (quoting Burch v.
State, 696 A.2d 433, 454 (Md. 1997)), aff’d, 924 A.2d 1072 (Md. 2007). By virtue
of the Maryland Criminal Code, all murders that are not in the first degree, as
defined under Section 2-201, are deemed murder in the second degree. MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-204 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016).
Owens, 906 A.2d at 1027.
Jones v. State, 114 A.3d 256, 261–62 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (quoting Thornton
v. State, 919 A.2d 678, 688 (Md. 2007)), cert. granted, 120 A.3d 766 (2015).
Robinson v. State, 517 A.2d 94, 100 (Md. 1986).
Dan Rodricks, Dan Rodricks: From Gang Killing to Gray Case, the Book on
Depraved-Heart Murder, BALT. SUN (July 13, 2015, 6:25 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-rodricks-0714-20150713column.html.
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employed have caused persistent problems.”75 The Maryland Law
Encyclopedia defines depraved heart murder as “a killing resulting
from the deliberate perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act with
reckless and wanton unconcern and indifference as to whether
anyone is harmed. It is the killing of another person while acting
with an extreme disregard for human life.”76 Depraved heart murder
has also been defined as “extremely negligent conduct,” creating both
an “unjustifiable” and “very high degree of risk,” which causes the
death of another.77
Maryland case law mirrors these treatises using essentially the
same descriptions, noting that the critical feature is the manifestation
of an extreme indifference to the value of human life.78 The
descriptions of willful and wanton are used, with “willful” meaning
the perpetrator should have reasonably realized the risk his behavior
created,79 and “wanton” being conceptualized as evincing “an
element of viciousness or contemptuous disregard for the value of
human life.”80
Depraved heart murder is included on a “matrix of blameworthy
states of mind that will support a verdict of either civil liability or
criminal guilt.”81 On this matrix, there are three degrees of fault
involved in negligent conduct: non-criminal negligence, “involuntary
manslaughter of the gross negligence variety,” and “second-degree
murder of the depraved heart variety.”82 Depraved heart murder
manifests the highest level of blameworthiness on this “culpability
ladder.”83 For a depraved heart murder conviction, there is no
requirement of express malice, or an intent to kill; rather, it is an
implied and variant form of malice that the common law treats as
equally blameworthy as specific intent because of the high level of
indifference to human life.84

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Alan C. Michaels, “Rationales” of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental
Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 85 (2000).
12 M.L.E. Homicide § 22 (2016) (footnote omitted).
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.4 (2d ed. 2016).
Robinson, 517 A.2d at 101.
Id. at 98 (quoting RICHARD P. GILBERT & CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND
CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.6-3 (1983)).
Id. (quoting GILBERT & MOYLAN, supra note 79).
Pagotto v. State, 732 A.2d 920, 923 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), aff’d, 762 A.2d 97
(2000).
Id.
Id.
Alston v. State, 643 A.2d 468, 472–73 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (quoting
DeBettencourt v. State, 428 A.2d 479, 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)), aff’d, 662
A.2d 247 (1995).
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2. The Blurry Line Between Depraved Heart Murder and
Involuntary Manslaughter in Maryland
While the definitions of depraved heart murder are sufficiently
vague on their own, one’s understanding becomes even more
complicated when examining the definition of involuntary
manslaughter. By definition, involuntary manslaughter involves
“‘gross deviations’ from the standard of care used by an ordinary
person where the negligent conduct can reasonably be said to
manifest ‘a wanton or reckless disregard of human life.’”85 While
there is a difference between murder and manslaughter,86 as evident
from the two different crimes, Maryland case law has yet to draw a
meaningful distinction.87 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
stated that judges and jurors can either sense or feel the difference
between the two “relatively easily on a case-by-case basis.”88
However, the reality is that “[t]he borderline between [depraved
heart murder and involuntary manslaughter] is, in the present state of
[Maryland] case law, a very blurred line.”89 The distinctions are
based upon degrees of risk, and there is “no exact boundary line
between each category; they shade gradually like a spectrum from
one group to another.”90 Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions
attempt to differentiate between second-degree depraved heart
murder and involuntary manslaughter.91 However, the instruction for
depraved heart murder indicates that the “defendant’s conduct
[created] a very high degree of risk . . . and the defendant, [conscious
of that risk], acted with extreme disregard of the life-endangering
consequences,” while involuntary manslaughter requires that the
State prove “the defendant, conscious of the risk, acted in a grossly
negligent manner . . . that created a high degree of risk to human
life.”92

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Pagotto, 732 A.2d at 923 (first quoting Dishman v. State, 721 A.2d 699, 704 (Md.
1998); and then quoting State v. Albrecht, 649 A.2d 336, 348 (Md. 1994)).
See id. at 923–24.
Id.; see also Dishman, 721 A.2d at 708 (“[O]ur cases have not drawn a precise line
between depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter.”).
Pagotto, 732 A.2d at 925 n.2 (suggesting that the court’s members adopt Justice
Stewart’s words in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964): “I know it when I see it.”).
Williams v. State, 641 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §
7.4 (2d ed. 1986) (current version at LAFAVE, supra note 77)).
See MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4:17.8 (2d ed. Supp. 2016).
Id.
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Essentially, the two crimes are almost identical to one another, the
difference lying in the heightened mens rea for depraved heart
murder.93 Adding to the overall confusion, Maryland courts have
defined both crimes by using the terms “reckless”94 and “wanton.”95
Additionally, depraved heart murder does not require a specific intent
to kill another person, and there is no requirement that more than one
life be placed in danger.96 Essentially, judges and jurors must then
determine what acts manifest a high degree of risk from a very high
degree of risk.97
The language of manifesting an extreme
indifference or disregard to human life has been used to try to help
jurors, “in ordinary language,” understand the task that is before
them.98 Some examples of conduct that rose to the level needed for
depraved heart murder range from shooting into a moving
automobile, playing Russian roulette, selling “pure” heroin, and
firing a bullet into an occupied room.99 Juries had to walk a blurry
line and decide under which degree of risk these actions fell.100 Thus,
not only are the terms used to define each crime vague, but the
courts’ use of the same exact terms to define each crime adds an extra
layer of uncertainty for jurors.
C. Problems in Relation to the Gray Case
One of the main issues in the Freddie Gray case, as Officer Porter’s
attorney recognized, was whether the failure of a police officer to
seatbelt someone in custody rises to the level of recklessness and is
such a gross departure from the standard of conduct of a reasonable
police officer that it can rise to the charge of second-degree
93.
94.

95.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Ashe v. State, 726 A.2d 786, 790–91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (noting that a
defendant must act with extreme disregard as opposed to a grossly negligent
manner).
Dishman v. State, 721 A.2d 699, 708 (Md. 1998); see also Robinson v. State, 517
A.2d 94, 97 (Md. 1986) (stating that depraved heart murder involves “the willful
doing of a dangerous and reckless act”); Duren v. State, 102 A.2d 277, 280 (Md.
1954) (stating that involuntary manslaughter requires “reckless disregard for human
life”).
Robinson, 517 A.2d at 97 (“[Depraved heart murder] involves the deliberate
perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act with reckless and wanton unconcern and
indifference as to whether anyone is harmed or not.” (quoting DeBettencourt v.
State, 428 A.2d 479, 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981))); State v. Albrecht, 649 A.2d
336, 348 (Md. 1994) (“[I]nvoluntary manslaughter must be gross or criminal, viz.,
such as manifests a wanton or reckless disregard of human life.” (quoting Mills v.
State, 282 A.2d 147, 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971))).
12 M.L.E. Homicide § 22, supra note 76.
LAFAVE, supra note 77.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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murder.101 This goes hand-in-hand with two of State’s Attorney
Marilyn Mosby’s repeated themes in the charging of the officers
involved: “that the handcuffed and leg-shackled Gray was never
secured by a seatbelt in the police wagon against police policy, and
that officers ignored repeated appeals for medical help from Gray.”102
Additionally, the timing of the injury proved to be an issue, as it was
difficult for the judge to tell if there was adequate notice for Goodson
to understand the severity of Gray’s injuries.103
The challenge is that it seems impossible to properly determine
whether Officer Goodson’s conduct exhibited the requisite high level
of disregard required by Maryland common law.104 It seems difficult
to assess whether the actions manifest a willful and wanton disregard
for human life, when examples of depraved heart murder seem so
egregious, such as firing a bullet into an occupied room.105 More so,
how does one determine whether this conduct exhibits a very high
degree of risk, or merely a high degree of risk resulting in the lessor
charge of involuntary manslaughter?106 A look to civil law may
provide some guidance.107
III. MODELS OF EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR
DETERMINING MENS REA
Currently, there are criminal statutory schemes that are used to help
distinguish between similar states of mind.108 There is a need for a
similar framework for second-degree depraved heart murder in order
to show various levels of culpability that are per se conduct evincing
a depraved heart, or that can be combined to ratchet up from an
101.

102.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Justin Fenton, Freddie Gray Officers Renew Challenge to Seatbelt-Related Charges,
BALT. SUN (Oct. 21, 2015, 8:54 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-gray-motionseatbelt-charges-20151021-story.html (noting further that this is not a matter of a
simple ride in the back of a police cruiser, but “involves the risk to a prisoner created
by transporting him in a police vehicle resembling a steel cage without a seatbelt —
while his hands and legs are physically restrained from movement”).
Marbella, supra note 12. Former Police Commissioner Anthony Batts even
acknowledged that Gray should have been buckled into the transportation vehicle
and that there are no excuses for this failure to act. Luke Broadwater, Baltimore
Police Acknowledge Mistakes in Freddie Gray’s Death, BALT. SUN (Apr. 24, 2015,
10:31 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-freddie-grayprotest-prepare-20150424-story.html.
Fenton & Rector I, supra note 69.
See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section III.A.
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involuntary manslaughter conviction to a depraved heart murder
conviction.109
A. Helpful Statutory Formulations
As mentioned, supra, there is no depraved heart murder statute in
Maryland.110 However, there are statutory schemes in place where
legislatures have imported negligence theories to hold someone
accountable for the unintentional death of another person (i.e., drunk
driving that causes the death of another) and have inserted higher
penalties for conduct that is seen as more egregious.111
Section 2-503 of the Maryland Code is the criminal statute for
homicide by motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
under the influence of alcohol per se.112 Under this statute, if a
person causes the death of another “as a result of the person’s
negligently driving, operating, or controlling a motor vehicle or
vessel while: (1) under the influence of alcohol; or (2) under the
influence of alcohol per se,” the person is guilty of a felony and is
subject to imprisonment not exceeding five years, or a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars, or both.113 Section 2-504, however,
is a statute for homicide by motor vehicle or vessel while impaired by
alcohol.114 If a person causes the death of another as “a result of the
person’s negligently driving, operating, or controlling a motor vehicle
or vessel while impaired by alcohol,” he is guilty of a felony and is
subject to up to three years in prison, a fine of up to five thousand
dollars, or both.115 The difference between the two statutes is the
amount of alcohol that the person who caused the death consumed.116
Influence per se, in Section 2-503, is defined as a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more.117 The legislature drew a line with
this number as to what level of alcohol is sufficient for a higher
penalty.118
Similarly, Section 2-210 is a statute for when a person causes the
death of another by operation of a vehicle or vessel in a criminally
negligent manner.119 For purposes of this statute, a person acts in a
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See infra Part V.
See supra notes 16, 73 and accompanying text.
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-503–2-504 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016).
Id. § 2-503 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. § 2-504 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. §§ 2-503–2-504.
Id. § 2-501 (LexisNexis 2012).
See supra notes 112–15, 117 and accompanying text.
CRIM. LAW § 2-210 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016).
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criminally negligent manner when he should be aware that his
conduct is causing a substantial and unjustifiable risk and the
person’s failure to perceive that risk “constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that would be exercised by a reasonable
person.”120 A violation of this statute, however, is classified as a
misdemeanor, with the penalty being “imprisonment not exceeding 3
years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.”121
Accordingly, it appears that a person who drinks alcohol while
operating a vehicle is more culpable than a person who merely acts in
a criminally negligent manner when no alcohol consumption is
involved and the death of a person results.122 However, if a person
operates or controls a vehicle in a grossly negligent manner, as
opposed to a criminally negligent manner, the person commits
manslaughter by vehicle, and the resulting penalty is a felony with
“imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000
or both.”123
These statutes and the resulting penalties depend on the various
levels of culpability (i.e., impairment) versus being at the “DUI”
level of 0.08 blood alcohol concentration, or being criminally
negligent versus grossly negligent.124 These statutes serve as models
and show that there is a method for distinguishing between degrees of
criminal negligence. The difference in conduct in each of these
statutes goes to how much a person knew or should have known he
was a risk to another human. Likewise, it seems viable that there
could be a statutory presumption of misconduct for depraved heart
murder.
IV. POSSIBLE RESOLUTION WITH THE IMPORTATION OF
TORT THEORIES
In formulating a similar statute for depraved heart murder, tort
theories should be applied because they illustrate the policy rationale
behind the proposal.125 Tort law recognizes certain circumstances
where a higher duty of care is owed; specifically, these circumstances

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. § 2-210(c).
Id. § 2-210(f).
See supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.
CRIM. LAW § 2-209 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016).
See supra notes 111–17, 119–21 and accompanying text.
It is not necessarily that they fall within these torts categories, but that these specific
relationships give rise to liability in a tort context and are thus why police officers in
this very specific context should be charged.
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involve common carriers and certain professionals.126 This Comment
argues that certain tort theories are not only helpful for understanding
when a police officer’s conduct rises to the level to be found
criminally negligent, but should also be implemented in drafting a
depraved heart murder statute.127 Borrowing from these concepts
provides a standard of care presumption for when a police officer
takes a citizen into custody because the citizen essentially loses the
ability to care for himself.128 These concepts can help identify what
the duty owed should be, and a totality of the circumstances approach
can help to establish the culpability of the police officer and whether
there was a high degree of risk involved in his behavior versus a very
high degree of risk involved when a person dies in his custody.129
A. Common Carrier
Common carriers transport persons and must serve the public on an
equal basis.130 As statutorily defined by Section 1-101(e)(1) of the
Public Utilities Article, common carriers include car and taxicab
companies, transit companies, motor boat companies, etc.131
Common carriers owe passengers “a duty to deliver them to their
destination as expeditiously as possible, consistent with safety.”132
This duty is more than ordinary care.133 Because common carriers
have passengers, and the passengers’ safety of their “lives and limbs”
is at stake, a carrier must “exercise the highest degree of care which
is consistent with the nature of its undertaking. . . . [and] is bound to
employ the utmost care and diligence which human foresight can
use.”134 The higher degree of care is sound from a public policy
standpoint “where the security of a person is frequently involved
under circumstances in which the carrier controls movement or
equipment.”135 While the vehicle is in motion, there may be
negligence if passengers are imperiled by the jerking or jarring of the

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

135.

See infra Sections IV.A–B.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
4 M.L.E. Carriers § 1 (2016).
Id. at Carriers § 2.
Id. at Carriers § 33.
Id. at Carriers § 45.
Id.; see also Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Seymour, 847 A.2d 973, 997 (Md.
2005) (“A common carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care to provide
safe means and methods of transportation for them.” (quoting Todd v. Mass Transit
Admin., 816 A.2d 930, 934 (Md. 2003))).
4 M.L.E. Carriers § 45, supra note 130.
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vehicle, including sudden starts or stops, if they are deemed
extraordinary.136
B. Professionals and Their Duties
If a defendant is of a professional status, the defendant’s duty of
care may not be merely that of ordinary or reasonable care.137
Lawyers, doctors, and other professionals “owe their clients the care
provided or generally accepted as the standard by qualified
practitioners in the same profession.”138 A leading treatise on tort
law recognizes that courts speak of duties within a certain list of
formal relationships, including the carrier-passenger relationship, but
notes that a relationship need not fit into a certain formalized
category per se.139 Duty, according to Dobbs, “is a question of
justice and policy, [and] some less formal or describable relationships
may work in the same way.”140
1. Custodians and Duties
A person who is in custody of another is owed a duty of reasonable
care from foreseeable harms that may arise,141 which includes any
self-destructive behavior.142 Jailers as custodians, for instance,
exercise control over inmates by virtue of legal authority.143 Dobbs
specifically mentions that this also applies to an officer who has a
person in his custody.144 The same principle extends to hospitals and
patients, parents and children, and schools and students.145 Even
more importantly to the discussion at hand, custody has taken on the
definition of the deprivation of a person’s liberty “so that he could no
longer protect himself or obtain aid from others.”146

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.

See id. at Carriers § 67.
DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 284 (2d ed. 2016).
Id. (“Given a recognized risk, all reasonable persons should use the knowledge and
skill at their disposal.”).
Id. § 415.
Id.
Id. § 418.
Id.
Id. (noting that the jailer has a duty to prevent suicide, for instance).
Id. In fact, Officer Novak testified during Officer Porter’s trial that “van drivers are
understood to have ‘primary custody’ of detainees in their vehicles.” Kevin Rector
& Justin Fenton, Officer Porter Takes the Stand in Trial in Freddie Gray’s Death,
BALT. SUN (Dec. 9, 2015, 9:47 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/f
reddie-gray/bs-md-porter-trial-wednesday-20151209-story.html.
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 137, § 418.
Id. § 419.
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V. APPLICATION OF TORT THEORIES TO EXISTING
COMMON LAW FOR DEPRAVED HEART MURDER
The only way to resolve the problem of depraved heart murder is
for the Maryland Legislature to pass a new criminal statute. The
formulation of a statute that provides for conduct that is per se the
level of mens rea needed to convict a police officer of depraved heart
murder will be helpful for a successful prosecution when a citizen
dies in his custody.147 Common law does not adequately address
what conduct exactly satisfies the malice needed for depraved heart
murder.148 The Freddie Gray case is a prime example: how is a
factfinder to decide whether the defendant possessed the mens rea for
depraved heart murder when the law provides nothing to help
distinguish it from involuntary manslaughter?149 The Legislature
should draft a depraved heart murder statute that describes specific
conduct that rises to the needed level.150 The above mentioned tort
theories provide the policy rationale for drafting the statute; the
police officer has a special relationship to someone in his custody,
and someone in custody cannot readily take care of himself.151
A. Proposed Statute
Second-Degree Depraved Heart Murder:
A person may not cause the death of another while acting
with an extreme disregard for human life. Conduct creating
a very high degree of risk, evincing an extreme disregard of
the life endangering consequences is presumed if the death
occurs:
(1) While failing to comply with an internal regulation,
coupled with:
(a) Failing to provide adequate care in rendering aid to an
individual in custody; and
(b) Having an opportunity to provide aid.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See infra Sections V.A–B.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
See infra Sections V.A–B.
See generally Jeremy Daniel Kernodle, Policing the Police: Clarifying the Test for
Holding the Government Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State-Created
Danger Theory, 54 VAND. L. REV. 165, 184–85 (2001) (justifying state-created
danger cases under a “special relationship” theory, in which an individual loses his
self-protection when placed in police custody and is essentially helpless).
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This proposed statute helps to solve the problem of vague depraved
heart common law standards. This concept is not new in criminal
law (e.g., the statutes regarding DUIs resulting in death).152
Importantly, the statute is not necessarily specific to police officers
because it may be useful in other situations where a death results
involving similar professionals with responsibility.153 There needs to
be better police policy, and a statute such as this one will help to
ensure that the policy is followed.
B. Application to the Gray Facts
The prosecutor can begin by tallying the acts of omission by
Officer Caesar Goodson. When first placed in the van, Gray asked
for and was denied medical assistance.154 Additionally, he was
placed into the van on the floor and was not buckled into a seat, per a
Baltimore City internal regulation requiring the use of seatbelts on
people in custody.155 During the third stop, Officer Goodson failed to
render aid or request medical assistance after Gray explicitly
indicated to Officer Porter that he was in need.156 During the fourth
stop, Officer Goodson found Gray in an unresponsive state but
headed toward the police station rather than the hospital.157 First,
after violating the regulation, Officer Goodson had an opportunity
with each stop to correct his mistake.158 Additionally, despite
whether Goodson was aware of the severity of Gray’s injuries, it was
brought to his attention several times that Mr. Gray may have been in
need of medical assistance.159 Still, Officer Goodson failed to render
aid even a single time.160
Additionally, Officer Goodson was acting in his professional
capacity as a police officer.161 What would have been generally
accepted in his profession would have been adherence to the
regulation to seat belt detainees.162 Officer Goodson, regardless of

152.
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See supra Part III.
For example, the statute could perhaps be applicable to jailers.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 36, 39–42, 47–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 36–48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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this mandate, would have been apprised of the expectation to use
seatbelts.163
VI. CONCLUSION
Successful prosecution under the theory of depraved heart murder
is challenging, due to ambiguities in the law. The challenge is
amplified when a police officer is charged with failure to act.164 The
proposed depraved heart murder statute, supra, shows conduct that
per se evinces an extreme indifference to human life.165 Legislatures
have distinguished between varying degrees of culpability when
someone causes a death while consuming alcohol at a certain level.166
The proposed statute, too, shows conduct that rises to a level above
involuntary manslaughter.167
Tort theories provide rationales for holding certain people more
responsible than others because of their profession and their
relationship to citizens in their care and custody.168 This is mirrored
in the police officer context because of the relationship and power
differential when one is in custody and the officer’s professional duty
to comply with regulations and act as other officers would act in
similar circumstances.169 This, combined with a second egregious
act, such as failure to provide aid to someone in need when there is
an opportunity to provide that aid, is enough to hold someone of this
standing guilty of depraved heart murder. The proposed statute
should be implemented to ensure successful prosecutions when a
citizen dies in a professional’s custody, regulations were not adhered
to, and medical aid was not given when needed.
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168.
169.

See Baltimore Police, Seat Belts and Freddie Gray, supra note 58.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section V.A.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section V.A.
See supra Part IV.
See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.

